The paper implementing the imperfect competitive equilibrium model, increasing returns to scale, the coordination failure problem and the learning-by-doing argument discusses the economic efficiency of local content requirements (LCRs). It is shown that the LCRs are economically unjustifiable not only within a simple competitive equilibrium model with perfect information, with no frictions, with constant returns to scale, but also within the world where increasing returns to scale are accrued. It is presented that the LCRs lead to suboptimal allocation of resources and reduce efficiency. However, the analysis demonstrates that the impacts of the LCRs are not as clear as the economic model might suggest once the coordination failure problem is taken into account. Nevertheless, it is proofed that if transportation costs take place and are non-negligible, there still exists a market incentive for investors to set up a production without any LCRs. And this market setting up of production surpasses the coordination failure. The analysis of the LCRs is also incorporating the learn-by-doing argument. It is clear that the learning-by-doing effect reduces the inefficiency arising from the LCRs. Nevertheless, it is shown that it is very uncertain whether future benefits from the technology improvement given by the learning-by-doing effect will outweigh the costs of the LCRs. Based on both economic principles and the results obtained from the carried out analysis the authors conclude that the LCRs reduce economic efficiency and international investment agreements should not allow using them in order to pursue market economy efficiency. As the paper presents, LCRs are not justified even if they are placed in return for receiving FDI incentives.
1.

Introduction
Local content requirements represent a special class of performance requirements. Performance requirements are measures by which host countries try to regulate foreign investors' activities in order to achieve certain (usually developmental) objectives. 1 The performance requirements can have a multitude of different forms like e.g. employment requirements, export requirements, research and development requirements, local content requirements and many others (see UNCTAD 2003 for a survey). In this paper, local content requirements will be explored in greater detail. By local content requirements we mean such measures, which force foreign investors to buy intermediate goods entering their production processes from local producers. In this way governments try to increase the value added produced in the host economy and to involve more domestic firms into the process of production.
Local content requirements were a quite common form of performance requirements in the past -they were even used by most of the developed countries from time to time (UNCTAD 2003, p. 10) . However, today they belong to the measures that are prohibited by Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMs) if they are a condition for an establishment or expansion of foreign investors' activities. Nevertheless, local content requirements (LCRs) can be a condition for receiving FDI incentives. But more importantly, some countries call for renegotiations of TRIMs Agreement on performance requirements, i.e. on local content requirements as well. Most notably this is the case of India and Brazil, which explicitly expressed their aim to modify the TRIMs Agreement (WTO Document G/C/W/428). But also some other developing countries would probably tend to employ some local content requirements in order to achieve development objectives. This is quite understandable because impacts of local content requirements are not as clear as the competitive equilibrium model might suggest.
The paper is organized in following way: in the next section implications of increasing returns to scale are explored. In the third section, it will be shown that the LCRs can serve as a way for surpassing a coordination failure, while in the fourth it is shown that conditions for the coordination failure to be persistent are rather strict. The fifth section combines increasing returns and coordination failures. The sixth section explores learning-by-doing argument in favour of LCRs.
Interaction of Local Content Requirements and Economies of Scale
It is obvious that local content requirements are economically unjustifiable within a simple competitive equilibrium model with perfect information, with no frictions, with constant returns to scale and other traditional assumptions. In such a world, the local content requirements simply reduce efficiency. However, the very existence of transnational corporations (TNCs) suggests, that reality deviates substantially from simplistic assumptions of competitive equilibrium. First, it is obvious that competition is imperfect and the TNCs have a certain degree of monopolistic power. Interactions of LCRs and imperfect competition were analysed in literature some time ago. Usual conclusions in this area are that the LCRs lead to a redistribution of monopolistic profits from the foreign owned firms, which are subject to the LCRs, to their local suppliers.
The LCRs are according to this view a kind of a complicated additional tax imposed upon foreign investors. In this setting the LCRs have no developmental effect. Undoubtedly it was this view that contributed to the ban of LCRs as a condition for establishment or expansion of investment. Even if the LCRs are not obligatory but they serve as a condition for receiving investment incentives, they are hard to justify. In this case, the LCRs reduce profits of the foreign owned firms but the incentives the firms receive obviously more than compensate for them. Therefore the foreign investors' profits are either intact or even increased. Part or all of the incentives are due to the LCRs transferred to the local suppliers of foreign owned firms. This time the foreign investors are not damaged but again the LCRs reduce efficiency as they distort market allocation. However, it may be objected that a model containing imperfect competition but with other traditional assumptions is too simple to justify LCRs. Therefore we will drop some of these assumptions and explore if it can change the conclusions concerning the LCRs. In this section we will drop the assumption of constant returns to scale.
Since the eighties, modern growth theories have been suggesting that the ubiquitous assumption of constant returns to scale may be inadequate in some cases. Increasing returns to scale are plausible in some industries due to agglomeration and synergy effects. The question is, what (if any) are the interactions of local content requirements with economies of scale. First, let us sketch logic of a possible interaction.
Consider a two-country model, in which country A represents a developed stationary economy with high wages and country B will stand for a host economy with low wages. It will be assumed that the rate of profit prevailing in A, A r , is lower than the rate of profit prevailing in B, B r . In economy B, a foreign investor sets up a plant for producing a certain product, let us denote it i. The product is either for local market or for export. Now suppose that for producing of a unit of i , a unit of a special intermediate good j is needed and due to technology no substitution is possible. Further let us suppose that there are increasing returns to scale in the production of j . The demand for j in the underdeveloped economy B is none or low relatively to the demand for it in A. Then market solution may lead to a production of j in the economy A despite the fact technology and knowledge are assumed to be the same in both economies and despite high wages in A. This result is due to a combination of three factors: low demand for j in B, "sufficiently" increasing returns to scale of the production of j and "sufficient" transport costs. If returns to scale are increasing "sufficiently", it means that producing j in A is more profitable than in B because of the size of the market for j . The efficiency of producing j in A due to increasing returns to scale is supposed to be so much higher, that it outweighs negative impact of high wages in A on profitability. However, sufficient transport costs are a necessary condition for this solution to persist. If transport costs are negligible, then obviously it is of no use to speak about a size of a market for j in B and in A respectively. In that case it makes sense to speak only about a market of ( ) B A + and the production of j would be localized in B because of lower wages and because the size of production would correspond to the demand in B A + (and not only to B) so increasing returns to scale would be fully used. The higher are the transport costs, then, of course, the more separated are the markets of A and B for the intermediate good j .
Let us shortly summarize the situation we sketched: a foreign investor set up a plant for producing i in the host country (B) but he has to import a special intermediate product j from the developed country (A). Production of j is localized in A due to increasing returns, large demand for j in A and due to the existence of transport costs. Now following questions arise. Would a local content requirement leading to a set up of production of j in B be justifiable under these circumstances? Or to put it in other way: does the existence of increasing returns change qualitatively conclusions of the traditional models as far as local content requirements are concerned? After all, production of j is localized in A only because it is already developed and has much stronger demand for j . In fact, exports of j from A to B further increase the efficiency of producing j in A due to increasing returns. Doesn't it even deepen the differences between the countries A and B? And more importantly: doesn't it mean that country B will never be able to produce j under pure market conditions simply because A has already reached a higher stage of economic development? Note that by assumption, the countries have access to the same technology, have the same human capital etc.
Local content requirement can therefore prima facie seem as a way by which the country B could escape the dismal conclusions suggested by the questions above. Say country B adopts a local content requirement as far as the good i is concerned. And suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that this local content requirement is so strict that it implies that all of the intermediate good j needed to produce i will have to be produced in B instead of being imported from A. The question is: will that lead to higher GDP in economy B? The answer is no. Let us show why.
Suppose that the price of a unit of j in the country A is 
where B w , B r and δ stand for wages in B, rate of profit in B and the depreciation rate respectively. The reason why neither in this case the local content requirement leads to an increase of GDP is straightforward. If the production factors j L and j K were not employed for production of j , they would be used for production of other goods. Their production would correspond to the prevailing wages, rate of profit and depreciation rate in B, i.e. in money terms the production of other goods would in total be ( )
. Although this is the same amount of production in money terms as in (1), still the local content requirement reduces efficiency. As it has been shown above, the price of j produced in B is higher than its price when imported from A, i.e. Further, let us show that neither the increasing returns will necessarily prevent the intermediary good j from being produced in B. If the size of production of i in B gradually grows, so does the demand for the intermediary good j . As the demand for j increases, sooner or later it will reach such a size that it will become profitable to produce j in B without any local content requirement at all. The size of the production of j in B does not have to be as big as in A in order that local producer(s) of j can compete with its imports from A. Local producers of j do not have to face large transportation costs when producing for local markets and have lower wage costs. Therefore the production of j can lead to sufficient rate of profit even though its size in B is much smaller.
In general, we can say that it has been shown that increasing returns per se do not justify local content requirements. Assuming that technology available to both economies is the same, local content requirements lead to suboptimal allocation of resources and reduce efficiency. They lead to higher prices of locally produced intermediate goods and thus reduce profits of producers that use these intermediate goods as inputs into their production processes. However, these producers are by assumption foreign owned firms. Therefore local content requirement can act as a kind of a tax inferred on foreign investors. If the profit rate reached by local producers of the intermediate good is higher than the profit rate prevailing in B, then local content requirement can theoretically increase national domestic product. Simply part of the foreign investors' profits is extracted and transferred to domestic producers. However, the same objections against this "tax" apply as in case of constant returns to scale.
Local Content Requirement as a Measure for Surpassing a Coordination Failure
In this section a different argument in favour of local content requirement will be explored. Consider a following modification of the preceding two-country model. Again suppose that foreign investors produce a given good i . For the production of a unit of i again a unit of an intermediary good j is needed, for the production of a unit of j a unit of a different intermediary good k must be used etc. Therefore we suppose that given the technology there exists a sequence of several intermediary goods -for the production of each intermediary good in this sequence the preceding intermediary good is necessary. Suppose that the sequence of intermediary goods is for simplicity as follows:
. Units of intermediary goods are chosen in such a way that one unit of a given intermediary good is needed for the production of one unit of the good that follows it in the sequence. Suppose that production of each good in the sequence is rather specific in the sense that only different producers can produce them. It means that the producer of i has to buy j from a different producer (he cannot produce it on his own), the producer of j has to buy k from yet another producer etc. All the intermediary goods can be produced either by local producers or they can be imported from A (again we suppose the same technology to be available in both countries). If they are imported, their price in B corresponds to their price in A plus the transportation costs per unit. This means that the price of j in B when imported is equal to
If the intermediary goods are to be produced by local firms, their price in B has to be lower or at most the same as if they were imported. Now we get already to the coordination failure argument. We can start our reasoning from the final good i . The producer of i (by assumption a foreign investor) decides whether to import j from A or whether to buy it from a local producer. Suppose that the production of i is a predominant source of the demand for j , i.e. j is not a suitable intermediate input for other goods than i . In that case it is likely that the production of j could be established in B only after the production of i is established (before there is no or only very little demand for j ). However, the production of j would be set up (in case there is no local content requirement) only if it would be sufficiently profitable for the producer of j selling it at a price of
. The technology available in B is the same as in A, labour costs are lower in B, still it is possible that the rate of profit would be lower in B than in A. The reason is following: for the production of a unit of j a unit of an intermediary input k is needed. But if k is not produced by local firms, the producer of j would have to import it from A for a price of
By assumption the producers of j in country A face higher labour costs but they buy a unit of k necessary for production of a unit of j only for
substantial they may outweigh the advantage of low labour costs in B and reduce the rate of profit below the rate prevailing in B. Using the previous notation we can rewrite this case as follows.
In (2) 
Y is the volume of production in physical units and at the same time it is the volume of imported input k in physical units (let us remind that we have chosen units in such a way that one unit of an intermediate good is needed for the production of one unit of a good that follows it in the production process). If condition (2) is met, it means that profitability of producing j in B would be insufficient and j would be imported. Neither k , nor intermediate goods in the previous stages of the production process would be produced in B if the demand for k is derived mostly or exclusively from (non-existent) production of j and the demand for l is derived from the production of k etc. Under the absence of local content requirement, which would force the producer of i to buy j from local producers, labour and capital are allocated in other activities than production of intermediate inputs for i at different stage of the production process.
In what sense can this be called a coordination failure? The point is that if the production of j were set up in B, the production of k might be set up in B as well as there would be demand for it. If k is produced by domestic firms, its price could be lower than k A k d p + , which in turn could make the production of j sufficiently profitable. The coordination failure is a failure of a potential producer of j and a potential producer of k to coordinate their actions. Simply put: k is not produced in B because without production of j there is no demand for it, while j is not produced in B because k is not produced domestically and to import this necessary input makes the production of j in B not enough profitable. If the potential producers of j and k were coordinated, production of both j and k could be set up. Of course, in case of the production of k another coordination failure could take place. By assumption, l is a necessary intermediary input for the production of k . So k may not be produced even if there is demand for it due to the domestic production of j . If there is no domestic production of l (as there was no demand for it before the production of k was set up), then l has to be imported for This is true if a condition analogous to (2) is met. Notice that it suffices the coordination failure to happen at one point of the assumed production process
and the part of the process preceding this point is broken. If k is not produced because importing l would make profits in this industry inferior, then neither l , nor m is produced in B. In that case j will or will not be produced in B depending on whether the rate of profit in this activity will or will not be sufficient despite k being imported.
Let us look at what this kind of coordination failure means for the resource allocation and efficiency in the economy B. Contrary to the case of increasing returns to scale per se, the coordination failure case really can reduce efficiency and local content requirement could (at least theoretically) help to surmount this failure. Say e.g. that the coordination failure takes place only at the stage j of the production process. This means that neither j , nor k and other intermediate goods are produced. However, it would be profitable enough to produce k , l and m in B for prices ( ) 
Are Coordination Failures Realistic?
We have sketched a scenario under which local content requirement could increase efficiency through eliminating a coordination failure. Let us summarize conditions under which this could happen and above all let us assess whether these conditions are realistic.
First, the intermediate goods must be rather specific. Suppose that product k in the production process above is employed as an input for a whole array of other goods and not only for j . The demand for it is therefore only marginally influenced by the domestic production (or the absence thereof) of j . If the product k is produced by local firms for
(otherwise it would be imported from A and not produced in B) and yet j is not produced but imported, then it is not due to a coordination failure but due to a comparative disadvantage of some sort. The specificity of intermediate goods limits the number and also the length of the production processes with possible coordination failures.
Say for example that m in the schematic process of
is not specific at all (e.g. electricity), then for assessing local content requirement only a shortened process
Sufficient transportation costs are also necessary for coordination failures to be possible. To show this, say again that j is not produced in B because k is not available at such a price that would make the production of j profitable enough and at the same time k is not produced in B only because j is not produced. If the transportation costs per unit of j and k are negligible, i.e. But this means that we cannot say that j is not produced in B just because k is not produced by local firms. Even if k were produced, it would be available at nearly the same price as if it were imported (due to the low transportation costs) and therefore j would not be produced anyway. The product j is not produced in B due to low profitability not due to a coordination failure. Similarly for the product k : if it is not produced it cannot be due to a coordination failure. Even if there is no domestic production of j and no domestic demand for it, the producer of k can export its production at price nearly A k p (due to negligible transportation costs). If production of k is not profitable enough when made for export then it will not be profitable enough when made for domestic demand either. In short, negligible transportation costs imply nearly the same prices in both economies and coordination failure is not a tenable argument.
However, it will be shown that even if the transportation costs are sizeable and the intermediate goods are specific, still the coordination failure may not be plausible. To see why, we have to explore in greater detail the transportation costs. Again let us suppose, that products j and k are not produced in the host economy without local content requirements due to a coordination failure. Production of j would not be profitable enough if k were to be imported and production of k is not profitable unless there exists domestic demand for it (i.e. production of j ). At the same time it holds that there must exist prices
, at which it is sufficiently profitable to produce j if k is made in B and it is also profitable to produce k if j is made in B.
Otherwise the absence of production of these goods in B would not be a coordination failure.
Therefore we can rewrite (2) as follows:
Now let us compare profitability of producing j if k were to be imported into B with profitability of producing j in A. The rate of profit in production of j in A, A j r , is as follows:
If j was produced in B and sold to the producer for a price of ( ) 
technology used for the production of j in the source and in the host country respectively. The technologies do not have to be the sameindeed the investor would tend to use more labour and less capital in B as labour is, by assumption, relatively cheaper there. But even if it was not technologically possible to change capital-labour ratio, still the investor could use the same technology in B as in A. It must be stressed that at this point we are making additional assumptions that constant returns to scale prevail and that there exists no minimal size of production. If that is true then B j r must be at least as high as if the technology used in A was used in B as well. From this it follows that:
The central question we are now after is whether A j B j r r > . Note that by assumption wages are much lower in B than in A so comparing (6) and (4) d ? Let us remind that one unit of k is an input for production of one unit of j . In other words we are asking whether it is realistic that to transport one unit of k is much more expensive than to transport one unit of j , which contains in itself one unit of k as its intermediate good. Although this case is not apriori impossible, still it seems more plausible that to transport one unit of k transformed into j is not much cheaper than to transport one unit of k per se. This reasoning leads us to a conclusion that the rate of profit achieved in producing j in B will almost surely be higher than the rate of profit in producing j in A, even if k had to be imported in B from A.
It is true that even though the rate of profit in production of j in B is higher than in A, still it may be lower than the rate of profit prevailing in B. In that case local investors would not set up the production of j but it remains a profitable opportunity for investors from A. To sum up the argument: unless the costs for transporting k are much higher than that for transporting j , the rate of profit B j r is higher than in A despite the existence of a coordination failure. And therefore there exists an incentive for the investors from A to set up the production in B without any LCRs. But setting up the production surpasses the coordination failure. In general we have drawn a conclusion that conditions for the coordination failure to be realistic are rather strict and unlikely.
A Synthesis of Coordination Failure and Increasing Returns to Scale
In this section we will combine arguments put forward in previous sections: increasing returns to scale and coordination failures. In the previous section it was shown that, even under the presence of a coordination failure, the rate of profit is probably (perhaps substantially) higher in the host economy (B) than in the home economy (A). This implies that the coordination failure is not persistent. However, this conclusion was drawn under an assumption of constant returns to scale and an assumption of no minimal size of production. If these assumptions are dropped, the conclusion can change.
First let us drop the assumption of constant returns to scale. Again, say that there is a coordination failure of potential producers of j and k , where k serves as an input for j . Above, it was argued that the rate of profit B j r is almost surely higher than A r even if k has to be imported. But this holds true mainly because a producer of j can use the same technology in B as in A (with the same capital-labour ratio or even lower), but at the same time the wages in B are much lower. Nevertheless, if increasing returns prevail in the given industry, then the same technology may not be available in B as in A. Increasing returns to scale mean that the size of production does matter. Therefore even if the producer in B uses the same capital-labour ratio, he will not reach the same productivity in B as in A unless the size of production in B is the same as in A. As the size of production of j in B would be much smaller than in A (due to a much smaller domestic demand for it), the rate of profit attainable in B in this industry would be below the rate of profit in A despite lower wages. Thus increasing returns to scale can make a coordination failure persistent. While under constant returns to scale the coordination failure was not tenable because high rates of profit attracted at least investors from A, this is no longer true under increasing returns to scale. However, the conditions of specificity and non-negligible transportation costs remain intact by increasing returns. If transportation costs are small relatively to the price of the product, coordination failure is untenable despite increasing returns.
Although increasing returns per se cannot justify the LCRs, they can make the coordination failure more realistic. In all the previous sections we have assumed that technology is the same in both economies. This is clearly unrealistic and indeed a difference in available technologies and in knowledge can make the case for the LCRs as will be shown in the next section.
Learning-by-doing Argument
In this section we will consider the so-called learning-by-doing argument. The learning-by-doing argument is one of many ways how technological progress is endogenized in modern growth theory. However, this argument goes back at least to Arrow (1962) as he noticed that the time needed for a construction of a plane of a given type declines as the number of planes already produced increases. This happens without any apparent change in technological or scientific knowledge. Workers and managers gradually find better and more efficient ways how to produce a given good. In fact it is rather "experience" than "technological progress" what the workers get by learning-by-doing. And it is plausible to assume that the more the firm have already produced of a given good, the more experience it has received from producing it. Thus we get a stock-flow relationship between technological knowledge (or experience) on one side and production on the other side. As it is usual, the flow (in this case production) is not related directly to the stock (technology) but to a change of the stock. Now let us show what this learning-by-doing argument has in common with local content requirements. The connection is rather straightforward. The local content requirement in fact increases demand for intermediate goods by foreign investors' firms. This leads both to higher prices of intermediate goods but also to higher production of domestic firms. Higher production of these firms then leads via the learning-by-doing effect to bigger increases in technology.
In order to be able to judge this aspect of local content requirements it is necessary to tract the preceding ideas more analytically. There are usually two ways how learning-by-doing is formalized in growth theory. Either the technology improvement is perceived as a side effect of capital accumulation (investment) -the more the firms invest, the more experience they get how to use factors of production. However, this formalization is learning-by-investing rather than learning-by-doing. Another way to formalize the technology improvement is to consider it to be a side effect of production. We will adopt this approach. But in contrast to modern growth theories we are not interested so much in technology growth itself. Instead we want to model technological catching-up. Let i A denote level of technology in an individual industry in a host economy (economy B in previous notation) and * i A will denote the highest level of technology that is attainable worldwide in a given moment in the given industry. We will assume that production in a host economy and any potential learning-by-doing effect in this economy are too small to influence growth rate of * A means, other things being equal, that fewer resources can be used to produce a given volume of production in the industry. These factors of production can then be employed in other activities. Therefore it is clear that the learning-by-doing effect reduces the inefficiency arising from the LCRs.
Let us return to the two-country model set up above. A foreign investor producing i in the host country decides whether to buy an intermediate input j from A (the home country) or from B (the host country). As in the previous sections the countries differ in wages and rates of profit and in addition to that they differ also in technology. Given higher rate of profit and lower technology level in B, under the absence of an LCR the investor will buy j from A for a price of ( )
2 If the LCR forces the investor to buy j from local producers, capital and labour used by the local producers are employed in a suboptimal way. However, production of j by local producers gets the process of technological catching-up started in the given industry. The higher is volume of production by local producers the higher is the speed of the technological catching-up. Although the inefficiency is smaller than if there were no learning-by-doing effect, still production of j in B remains inefficient up to a certain moment. As production of j increases technological knowledge possessed by local producers, at some point in time the local technology may reach such a level that production of j will be profitable enough even if the price per unit of j declines below ( ) In order to assess whether the LCR does increase efficiency in longterm perspective, we have to compare its costs and benefits. Its costs in a given moment t depend on the difference of price of the production of j under the LCR and the price of imported volume of j , i.e. , the higher are the costs of imposing the LCR. In general it is uncertain whether future benefits will outweigh the costs of the LCR, but it must be admitted that it is possible. This somewhat qualifies strong conclusions about the LCRs drawn from simple models without any learning-by-doing effects mentioned in the second section.
Conclusions
Local content requirements as a special class of performance requirements were very often used by host countries to regulate foreign investors' activities in order to achieve certain economic objectives. The LCRs are still used as a condition for receiving FDI incentives. Nevertheless, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures prohibits using performance requirements as a condition for an establishment or expansion of foreign investors' activities. The paper implementing the imperfect competitive equilibrium model, increasing returns to scale, the coordination failure problem and the learning-bydoing argument have discussed the economic efficiency of local content requirements in more details.
The results have shown that the LCRs are economically unjustifiable not only within a simple competitive equilibrium model with perfect information, with no frictions, with constant returns to scale, but also within the world where increasing returns to scale are accrued. It has been presented that the LCRs lead to suboptimal allocation of resources and reduce efficiency. They lead to higher prices of locally produced intermediate goods and thus reduce profits of producers that use these intermediate goods as inputs into their production processes.
However, the analysis has demonstrated that the impacts of the LCRs are not as clear as the economic model might suggest once the coordination failure problem is taken into account. Nevertheless, it was proofed that if transportation costs take place and are non-negligible, there still exists a market incentive for investors to set up a production without any LCRs. And this market setting up of production surpasses the coordination failure. In general we have drawn a conclusion that conditions for the coordination failure to be realistic are rather strict and very unlikely in order to justify LCRs.
Finally, our analysis of the LCRs has also incorporated the learn-bydoing argument. It is clear that the learning-by-doing effect reduces the inefficiency arising from the LCRs. Nevertheless, it has been shown it is very uncertain whether future benefits from the technology improvement given by the learning-by-doing effect will outweigh the costs of the LCRs.
Based on both economic principles and the results obtained from the carried out analysis we can conclude that the LCRs reduce economic efficiency and international investment agreements should not allow using them in order to pursue market economy efficiency. As the paper has shown, LCRs are not justified even if they are placed in return for receiving FDI incentives.
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